Actor Profile: Who are the Communist Party of India (Maoist)?

The Communist Party of India (Maoist) is an umbrella insurgent organisation and political party that was formed on 21st September 2004 out of the merger of the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). The People’s War Group and the MCCI have both been active insurgent groups from the mid-1970s to early 1980s in the Red Corridor, a region that consists of parts of present-day Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Bihar, Maharashtra, and West Bengal. The merger of the two groups was the result of the PWG’s initiative of bringing together all the Naxalite (left-wing extremist) groups under a single banner.

The CPI-Maoists followed a blended communist ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (MLM) as a result of its two predecessors in its initial days. However, in the face of increasing pressure from security forces, dwindling numbers within their ranks, and differences between the PWG and the MCCI, Maoist thought has emerged as the driving ideology of the merged group. The CPI-Maoists view the Indian state as being run by a “collaboration of imperialists, the bourgeoisie and feudal lords”, according to a Hindustan Times profile on PWG leader Muppala Lakshmana Rao, alias “Ganapathi”. They believe the state partakes in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal system. A communist revolution by means of a ‘protracted armed struggle’ to seize power to overthrow the perceived fascistic state continues to be a sort of mission statement of the CPI-Maoists. Executing such an armed struggle includes a rejection and disruption of democratic institutions, such as elections and other forms of democratic engagement.

As Maoists, the group stands firmly against the mainstream communist parties in India, the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPIM) and maintains close ties with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Communist Party of Bhutan-Maoist (CPB-M). The first General Secretary of the group, Ganapathi, also formed a People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) to forge alliances and provide revolutionary aid in countries such as Peru, Türkiye, and the Philippines, among others.

In terms of organisational structure, the central level consists of a Politburo (the central decision-making body), a 32-member Central Committee (which relays Politburo decisions to party members), and the Central Military Commission (the main armed wing). The CMC commands several regional military and intelligence departments. The CPI-Maoists also use several smaller organisations as fronts, such as the Ayyankali Pada in Kerala, the Radical Youth League in Andhra Pradesh, the Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan (which promotes tribal women to join the armed revolution), and the Chetna Natya Manch (aimed at promoting Marxism-Leninism-Maoism through street plays and other cultural activities), among others. Maoist groups often use their front organisations to build up local support in villages and tribal areas before converting them into guerrilla outposts.

The military wing of the CPI Maoist, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) operates in three levels. The main force, consisting of conventional military platoons and special action teams, can carry out operations anywhere as the main army of the CPI (Maoist); the secondary force is comprised of special guerrilla squads operating in a more localised setting. They are less equipped than the main force, with a guerrilla squad of 12 troops only having an assault weapon or two. The Jan Militia (or People’s Militia) acts as the base-level unit only equipped for self-defence.

Being a guerrilla army, the CPI Maoists often make use of meticulously planned raids by the PLGA as the first step to seizing control over an area. These raids are planned by the Central Military Committee over several months and often target commercial assets such as mines and construction sites, as well as police and military positions. It is from these raids that the PLGA acquire their arms and ammunition, yielding several types of explosives such as IEDs and RDX cables, along with locally made pistols and rifles, as well as INSAS and AK-47 rifles stolen from killed army personnel. It has been observed that these militants do not always mask their raids by using locals as a smokescreen, as they depend on amassing local support for survival.

Ambushes carried out by the Jan militia on security personnel and convoys are another often-used tactic. This weakens security forces’ operational capacity while providing militants with additional arms and vehicles. Surviving security personnel and/or government representatives, such as district collectors, are often kidnapped and used as leverage for ransom. Unlike raids, which often take about six months to plan, ambushes and abductions are planned and surgically executed, all within a few hours, only if assured of success.

Assassinations of high-profile targets and local leaders are another tactic used to gain notoriety among the population. Attempts on leaders also lure governments and police forces into excessive responses, which leads to the alienation of certain groups. For example, the landmine attack on then-Chief Minister of West Bengal, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, in 2008 led to Operation Lalgarh, which drove most of the tribal communities in the Jungal Mahal area to fringe ideologies, boosting recruitment and morale for the CPI Maoists.

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